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AbstrAct: The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, created by the new health 
reform law, has a mandate to develop innovative payment models to improve health care 
delivery. To achieve higher quality and slower cost growth, the new center should be pre-
pared to try a variety of approaches that will encourage and reward more integrated care 
across the health care continuum and work with other public programs and private pay-
ers and purchasers to provide consistent incentives for providers and patients. This paper 
addresses several issues related to facilitating the process of identifying, developing, 
implementing, and monitoring new initiatives, while recognizing the need to maintain the 
fiscal integrity of the Medicare program and to focus on new initiatives that show promise 
to improve quality and control costs. 
                    
OvervIew
During his first presidential campaign, Franklin Roosevelt said: “The country 
needs, and unless I mistake its temper, the country demands, bold, persistent, 
experimentation. It is common sense to take a method and try it. If it fails, admit 
it frankly and try another. But above all, try something.”1 With health care spend-
ing putting increasing pressure on households, employers, and government bud-
gets, it is more important than ever to try new ideas that have a reasonable pros-
pect of slowing cost growth, improving quality, and increasing value. 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 establishes new 
payment initiatives to offer incentives for better and more efficient health care.2 
The success of those initiatives, however, will depend on the ability to identify 
and carry out needed changes in the way health care is delivered and paid for and 
the flexibility to tailor innovations to the circumstances in which they are applied. 
This issue brief discusses how the development, implementation, and 
evaluation of new approaches to paying for care can be improved, and how those 
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improvements can help achieve the broader goals of 
health reform. We focus largely on Medicare, but also 
consider the potential for enhancing the impact of 
Medicare payment innovations through multipayer col-
laborations involving other public programs, such as 
Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(CHIP), as well as private insurers and purchasers of care. 
tHe NeeD FOr PAymeNt AND DelIvery 
system reFOrm
The U.S. health care delivery system is fragmented. 
Even when the individual health care services provided 
to a patient meet high standards of clinical quality, 
the coordination of care, which may be delivered by 
multiple providers in multiple settings, often is lack-
ing. Inadequate communication among providers, and 
between providers and patients and their families, is 
also common. There is a vacuum of accountability for 
the total care of patients, the outcomes of their treat-
ment, and the efficiency with which medical resources 
are used.
The way the nation pays for care fuels this 
fragmentation and fosters this lack of accountability. 
Fee-for-service payment, which predominates through-
out the health system, emphasizes the provision of 
health services by individual providers, rather than 
care that is coordinated across providers to address 
the patient’s needs. Under this system, providers are 
offered strong incentives to deliver complex services 
and procedures, even when there may be better, sim-
pler, and lower-cost ways to treat the patient. Volume, 
rather than value, is rewarded, while efforts to coordi-
nate care are not—moreover, no support is provided 
for the infrastructure required to make such efforts suc-
cessful. Consequently, fee-for-service payment com-
plicates efforts to promote accountability in the health 
care system, with no clear lines of responsibility for the 
overall quality, outcomes, or costs of patient care. 
If the objectives of health reform—improved 
access, higher quality, and slower cost growth—are 
to be achieved, the health care delivery system must 
be reformed to provide coordinated, appropriate, and 
effective care, with accountability for patient outcomes 
and population health, and more diligent stewardship 
of the nation’s health care resources. But changing the 
way health care is organized and delivered requires 
a change in the way it is paid for—with alternative 
approaches that would better align financial incentives 
with system goals, and enable and encourage providers 
to consider their patients’ needs in a broader context, 
collaborate to provide the care that they need, and take 
mutual responsibility for patient outcomes and cost. 
relAtIONsHIP betweeN PAymeNt  
AND OrgANIzAtION
In developing new payment approaches, it is important 
to consider the diverse array of organizational models 
that make up the health care delivery system and the 
different environments in which those organizations 
operate. Provider organizations vary widely in size, 
scope, and degree of integration, and in the extent to 
which they may be willing or able to assume broader 
clinical or financial accountability for their patients’ care.
Traditional fee-for-service Medicare, like most 
other payers, makes direct payments only to indepen-
dently practicing physicians, hospitals, and other indi-
vidual service providers. Successfully moving away 
from the perverse incentives provided by the current 
system and toward alternative payment approaches and 
organizational models—such as the bundled payment 
approach and accountable care organization model 
specified in the new health reform law—requires rec-
ognition that health care delivery may be configured 
differently in different geographic areas. At least at 
the outset, then, payment and delivery system reforms 
must include an array of payment approaches that 
are compatible with providers’ current organizational 
structure. At the same time, the reforms must establish 
rewards and requirements that both encourage high 
quality and value and create incentives for those orga-
nizations to offer more coordinated care.
A schematic depicting the interaction between 
payment methods and organizational models is pre-
sented in Exhibit 1. Payment approaches can range 
from the current fee-for-service system to more 
bundled approaches, including global payment that 
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covers all the health care provided to each patient 
during a year. Organizational models can range from 
small practices and unrelated hospitals to groups of 
providers in single-specialty or multispecialty practices 
or fully integrated delivery systems. The more inte-
grated a health care organization is, the more feasible it 
becomes for that organization to take responsibility for 
a larger bundle of patient care. The availability of more 
sophisticated—and more substantial—rewards for 
organizations that deliver more effective and efficient 
care can provide an incentive for providers to move 
toward greater coordination and accountability and 
away from the fragmented delivery system that patients 
currently face.
As payment methods and incentives change, 
those who deliver care will be able to innovate in 
response to those incentives. The right incentives can 
encourage providers to work together, either in formal 
organizations or in less-formal relationships, in ways 
that enable them to take broader responsibility for the 
patients they treat and the resources they use—and 
benefit from doing so. As organizational arrangements 
evolve, payment methods can be continuously adjusted 
to encourage and reward ever-increasing levels of 
accountability. But even over time, different payment 
approaches and organizational models may be required 
in different geographic areas and different market con-
ditions to accomplish the goals of health reform.
PAymeNt INItIAtIves tO AlIgN 
INceNtIves AND cONtrOl cOsts
The need to change how we pay for health care has 
been recognized for several decades. Initiatives in both 
the public and private sectors have aimed to change the 
incentives embedded in fee-for-service payment, and 
these provide a foundation for broader payment reform:
The Medicare program has constructed systems •	
for collecting and reporting data on the qual-
ity of care offered by hospitals, nursing homes, 
home health agencies, and dialysis facilities, 
and a similar system is planned for physicians. 
The program also has been testing models for 
rewarding high-quality performance by hos-
pitals and physicians and is beginning to test 
value-based purchasing models for nursing 
homes and home health agencies. In addition, 
Medicare has been testing models for improving 
coordination of care among different types of 
providers, as well as several models of broader 
system redesign.
Exhibit 1. Relationship Between
Payment Methods and Organizational Models
Source: Adapted from A. Shih, K. Davis, S. Schoenbaum, A. Gauthier, R. Nuzum, and D. McCarthy, Organizing the U.S. Health 
Care Delivery System for High Performance (New York: The Commonwealth Fund, Aug. 2008).
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Medicaid programs in more than half the •	
states have pay-for-performance systems in 
place, and many more have plans to adopt such 
approaches. Several states have implemented 
payment reform initiatives to improve access 
and coordination; some are actively support-
ing delivery system reform, for example, by 
promoting patient-centered medical homes and 
accountable care organizations.3
Within the private sector, there are many initia-•	
tives aimed at improving quality and efficiency. 
Private payers are also pursuing alterna-
tive approaches to payment and encouraging 
greater coordination among the various provid-
ers responsible for treating different patient 
populations.
In September 2009, the U.S. Secretary of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) announced plans to 
allow Medicare to join Medicaid and private insurers 
in innovative state-based advanced primary care initia-
tives. This type of coordination among payers however, 
is an exception; consequently, the initiatives developed 
by different payers suffer from the same fragmentation 
that many of them are intended to reduce. (Additional 
detail on some of the particularly noteworthy initiatives 
is provided in the Appendix.)
PAymeNt INNOvAtION PrOvIsIONs IN 
tHe HeAltH reFOrm lAw
The health reform law contains several provisions to 
develop new payment initiatives intended to improve 
quality and efficiency and curtail costs.4 The law calls 
for pilot projects to assess the effectiveness of medical 
homes, accountable care organizations, bundled pay-
ment, pay-for-performance, and several other payment 
and system innovations in achieving those objectives. 
The law also would create a Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Innovation within the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS) to oversee the develop-
ment, implementation, and evaluation of pilot projects 
to improve care and reduce costs, with the authority to 
extend and/or expand those projects if they are found 
to be successful.
major Payment and Delivery system 
Initiatives
The health reform law specifies a number of new ini-
tiatives to be conducted by Medicare or Medicaid, or 
both. Some of the major initiatives related to payment 
and delivery system reform are reviewed below.
Medical home demonstration. Medicare is 
developing a medical home demonstration in which 
Medicare beneficiaries with multiple chronic condi-
tions designate a certified physician to provide them 
with comprehensive and coordinated care for a per-
patient care management fee, in addition to the usual 
fee-for-service payments. Other medical home mod-
els to be tested by the new Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Innovation include patient-centered medical 
homes for high-need individuals, medical homes that 
address women’s unique health care needs, and models 
that transition primary care practices away from fee-
for-service–based reimbursement and toward compre-
hensive or salary-based payment. 
The reform law also will establish community-
based health care teams to support medical homes in 
small practices; entities eligible to serve this func-
tion will include states or state-designated entities 
and Native American tribes or tribal organizations. It 
will allow states to enroll Medicaid beneficiaries with 
chronic conditions into a “health home,” in which a 
team of health professionals provides a comprehensive 
set of medical services, including care coordination. 
Accountable care organizations. The account-
able care organization (ACO) is an organizational 
model based on three key features: local accountability 
for the effective management of a full continuum of 
care; shared savings based on historical trends and 
adjusted for differing patient populations; and perfor-
mance measurement including outcomes and patient 
experience.5 Though these three features are common 
across ACOs, each organization is potentially different, 
depending on its mix of patients, configuration of pro-
viders, and other factors related to the environment in 
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which it operates. The ACO model also is compatible 
with a wide array of payment approaches.
The recently enacted legislation establishes 
a shared-savings pilot for ACOs, to begin in 2012. 
Participating providers will receive additional pay-
ments for savings relative to a cost benchmark, subject 
to quality improvement requirements. The HHS secre-
tary will have the authority to extend or expand the use 
of models found to be successful.
The law also establishes a Medicaid pediatric 
ACO demonstration project, in which qualified pediat-
ric providers could receive payments as an ACO, sub-
ject to certain performance guidelines.
Bundled payment. Bundled payment is an 
approach in which providers receive a fixed amount 
to cover a specified set of services—usually related 
to a particular event, illness, or individual. Providers 
paid in this way have a strong incentive to manage 
the resources they use to provide that set of services. 
Examples of bundled payment in Medicare include: 
the global surgical fee, a single payment covering all 
preoperative care and postoperative follow-up care, as 
well as the surgery itself (including the surgeon’s costs, 
but not the hospital’s or other providers’ costs); the pro-
spective payment for inpatient hospital services, which 
covers hospital costs for the duration of a patient’s 
stay (but does not cover physician services provided 
in the hospital); the home health episode-based pay-
ment, which covers all the services provided by home 
health agencies for a 60-day episode of care; and the 
Medicare Advantage (private Medicare plan) payment, 
which applies to all covered care a beneficiary receives 
in a month. 
The new law will establish a Medicaid demon-
stration project in up to eight states to study the use of 
bundled payments for hospital and physician services 
provided during an acute care episode. Each participat-
ing state could target the project to particular categories 
of beneficiaries, beneficiaries with particular diagno-
ses, or particular geographic regions of the state, with 
the requirement that the project be as representative as 
possible of the demographic and geographic composi-
tion of the state’s Medicaid beneficiaries.
A national voluntary pilot program on payment 
bundling for acute care episodes, involving hospital, 
physician, and post-acute care and focusing on selected 
conditions, will begin by 2013. Providers will be able 
to share in any Medicare savings, subject to perfor-
mance on quality improvement measures. Also called 
for in the new law is a community-based care transi-
tions program to improve care for high-risk Medicare 
beneficiaries during their move from one care setting 
to another (e.g., from hospital to home health care).
The legislation also contains a provision for a 
Medicaid global payment system demonstration proj-
ect in up to five states. Participating states will adjust 
their current payment structure for safety-net hospitals 
from a fee-for-service model to a capitated payment 
structure, with a single payment covering all services 
provided to each patient.
medicare Advantage
Another important issue addressed in health reform 
is a major revision in how payment for Medicare 
Advantage plans is determined. Medicare Advantage is 
the program that gives Medicare beneficiaries the option 
of enrolling in private plans, rather than traditional fee-
for-service Medicare, to receive their coverage.
The new policy establishes different payment 
benchmarks in each county (phased in from 2012 
through 2016). These benchmarks reflect per capita 
spending in fee-for-service Medicare and the county’s 
level of spending relative to the distribution across 
all counties in the U.S., with both higher benchmarks 
and higher rebates (extra payments based on a propor-
tion of the difference between the plan’s bid and the 
applicable county benchmark) for plans that perform 
well on quality and patient experience metrics.6 The 
changes eliminate, over time, most of the extra pay-
ments (relative to fee-for-service Medicare) that have 
characterized the Medicare Advantage program since 
2004, and for the first time establish substantial perfor-
mance-based rewards.7 
The new payment provisions, along with other 
provisions enacted in 2009, make Medicare Advantage 
more promising as a platform for developing new 
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payment approaches.8 The new approaches also could 
lend insight to strategies for coordinating care in fee-
for-service Medicare as well.
center for medicare and medicaid 
Innovation
The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, 
which is to be launched in 2011, will test innovative 
payment and service delivery models that have the 
potential to reduce program expenditures while pre-
serving or enhancing the quality of care furnished to 
beneficiaries in Medicare or Medicaid, or both. The 
HHS secretary is given new authority to develop pilot 
projects that might increase program spending ini-
tially, but they would have to be terminated if they are 
not expected to improve the quality of care or reduce 
program spending over time (as determined, respec-
tively, by the CMS administrator and chief actuary). 
The pilots will be formally evaluated, as well, for their 
impacts on quality and costs, and the secretary will 
have authority to expand the application of a model if 
such expansion is expected to improve quality, reduce 
program spending, or both. Beginning in 2012, the 
secretary is required to submit to Congress a biannual 
report on the activities of the new center. 
The legislation provides $5 million for design, 
implementation, and evaluation in fiscal year 2010 and 
$10 billion for pilots initiated from 2011 through 2019, 
with further funding available after that initial period. 
In addition, $25 million is available specifically for 
designing, implementing, and evaluating the models to 
be assessed. 
successFully ImPlemeNtINg PAymeNt 
INNOvAtION 
In creating the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Innovation, the legislation provides a mechanism to 
develop alternatives to the fee-for-service system and 
its adverse incentives. The pilot projects initiated by 
the center are intended to help improve effectiveness 
and efficiency within the health system while encour-
aging and supporting a focus on patients’ needs. 
Focus, Organization, and management of 
the center
Although the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Innovation offers the potential to develop needed pay-
ment reforms, several issues need to be considered 
related to its role and how that role is to be carried 
out. How these issues are addressed will be critical to 
the center’s success. Following are some suggestions 
for federal policymakers as they delineate the center’s 
scope and structure and determine how its initiatives 
are to be selected and developed.
Payment innovation pilots should not be limited to 
Medicare but should also include Medicaid and other 
public programs as well as the private sector. One of 
the key shortcomings of our health system is the frag-
mented nature in which health care is provided. With 
few notable exceptions—the Advanced Primary Care 
Initiative recently announced by the HHS secretary 
being one—Medicare demonstrations and pilot projects 
very rarely involve collaboration with Medicaid, the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), or pay-
ers in the private sector.9 There are great potential ben-
efits to be gained from such collaboration in broad pay-
ment reform initiatives. Nine of 10 respondents (89%) 
to a recent Commonwealth Fund/Modern Healthcare 
Health Care Opinion Leaders survey favored collabo-
ration in multipayer initiatives of this type.10
Collaborative efforts across the public and 
private sectors to develop innovative approaches to 
payment and health care delivery could have several 
beneficial effects. Such multipayer initiatives could:
magnify the power of any new incentives by •	
sending consistent signals about what is valued 
across different payers;
reduce administrative burden for health •	
care providers responding to new payment 
approaches; and
provide a way to address unwarranted variation •	
in payment methods and rates—that is, those 
not reflective of differences in the costliness of 
patients treated—among different payers.11
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Such an effort across the public and private 
sectors may also help accomplish important goals of 
health care reform—to enhance quality, to expand use 
of evidence-based medicine, and to improve care coor-
dination, while making health care more affordable—
and to quickly promote and disseminate new payment 
models consistent with these goals.
Both ‘top-down’ and ‘ground-up’ approaches should 
be considered. Medicare traditionally has played the 
lead role in developing and implementing new pay-
ment policies, but as described above (and in more 
detail in the Appendix), there are many new initiatives 
under way in other public programs and the private 
sector. CMS should be prepared to take the lead in 
developing new approaches to paying for health care, 
but it should be open to initiatives developed and 
led by states or private sector entities. CMS should 
actively encourage states to propose waivers for multi-
payer payment reform.
An array of payment models, gain-sharing and risk-
sharing arrangements, and reward systems should 
be included among the pilots developed and imple-
mented, and the process should allow for flexibility in 
modifying those models as experience is gained. The 
new legislation specifies a number of new models and 
payment approaches that the Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Innovation might try as pilot programs:
The accountable care organization, described •	
above, is an organizational model that exists in a 
variety of forms and should be compatible with 
a variety of payment approaches. Among the 
approaches that could be tried initially is fee-
for-service payment with shared savings, similar 
to Medicare’s ongoing Physician Group Practice 
(PGP) demonstration, in which participating 
practices are paid on a fee-for-service basis but 
with a bonus for holding total Medicare pay-
ment below an established growth rate target. 
The ACO model also can be compatible with a 
partial capitation approach, in which payments 
are based on a blend of fee-for-service rates and 
a global per-patient amount.
The patient-centered medical home is another •	
organizational model with several potential 
forms, and similarly should be compatible with 
alternative payment approaches. One common 
payment approach is a combination of fee-
for-service payment with a per-patient fee for 
providing medical home services—the method 
planned for the Medicare demonstration under 
development. Another approach is to make a 
global payment for primary care to the medi-
cal home provider, which would be receiving a 
direct reward for managing patients efficiently.
The health reform law also specifies several •	
bundled payment approaches, under which a 
single payment is made for a specified set of 
services, such as for all hospital and post-acute 
care. There are several ways of defining the ser-
vices included in the bundle and the applicable 
payment amount; the key is to provide a group 
of providers with the incentive to assume joint 
responsibility for the clinical and financial out-
comes of their patients’ care.
For integrated delivery systems—those now •	
in operation and those that will develop over 
time in response to new incentives—global 
per-patient payment might be most appropriate. 
This approach, applied to a system that is orga-
nized to assume responsibility for all of the care 
needed by its patients, can provide more flexi-
bility in determining the appropriate amount and 
mix of care, because the provider is not focused 
on generating a fee for each service performed. 
Various strategies for mitigating or sharing risks 
(as discussed below) may encourage more sys-
tems to participate.
Making private plans available to Medicare •	
beneficiaries originally was seen as an opportu-
nity not only to expand beneficiary choice but 
also to allow the program to benefit from the 
potential for greater efficiency that private plans 
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were thought to offer. With extra payments and 
the resulting distortion of incentives under the 
program largely eliminated by the new legisla-
tion, Medicare Advantage—Medicare’s private 
plan option—may once again provide a platform 
for developing new models of coordinated care 
and allow the program to benefit from the best 
features of both traditional Medicare and private 
coordinated care plans.
Regardless of the organizational models or 
payment approaches that are implemented, certain 
features can enhance the appropriateness of the incen-
tives that providers face. The availability of payments 
for high quality, desirable outcomes, coordination, and 
patient satisfaction can focus attention on those aspects 
of care. Shared savings might be used to provide a 
direct incentive for efficiency; linking the distribution 
of shared savings to measures of quality improvement 
can help safeguard quality while encouraging effi-
ciency (an approach being used in the PGP demonstra-
tion mentioned above and described in more detail in 
the Appendix). Both the types and sizes of the incen-
tives provided in the new pilot projects will be impor-
tant, not only for incorporating appropriate incentives 
but also for making voluntary participation in the pilots 
desirable to prospective providers.
Bundled payments and global payments 
involve some financial risk for providers who, although 
they may be willing and able to take clinical respon-
sibility for their patients, often are not in a position 
to manage the corresponding financial risk. Since the 
objective of the new pilot projects should be primar-
ily to encourage the former, approaches to mitigate 
financial risk may serve both to maximize the effec-
tiveness and fairness of the payment incentives and 
make pilots more attractive to prospective participants. 
Reinsurance can be used to limit the losses that a pro-
vider might have to bear in treating a few exceptionally 
expensive patients—the outlier policy in Medicare’s 
inpatient hospital prospective payment system is an 
example of an internally financed reinsurance mecha-
nism. Alternatively, providers could be allowed to 
acquire private reinsurance. Risk corridors, in which 
payment is partially adjusted to reflect unusually high 
or low costs, also could be used to defray some of the 
risk that providers might face.
A key requirement is the establishment of an 
explicit set of objectives for payment reform and a 
system for monitoring and evaluating each pilot’s per-
formance relative to those objectives. Each pilot should 
be adapted to the environment in which it is being 
implemented, and only those that are successful should 
be permitted to continue. Also needed is a system of 
incentives that encourage other potential participants 
to develop their own models to suit their particular cir-
cumstances—provided these models show real promise 
of achieving the specified objectives.
There should be flexibility in determining the size of 
the pilots implemented by the Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid Innovation. Provider participation 
should be maximized, subject to the objectives of the 
individual pilot and the potential ability of provid-
ers to achieve those objectives. The objective of the 
center should be to put in place payment and delivery 
models that can be successful in the environments in 
which they operate. It is crucial that these pilot projects 
be viewed not as an attempt to determine a defini-
tive model that can be universally applied to improve 
health care and control costs, but as part of a process to 
determine a range of models that can help achieve the 
goals described above in a way that is suited to each 
local health care system. Pilot projects should be large 
enough to have a significant impact in the areas in 
which they are implemented. But allowing some small 
initiatives may facilitate the testing and development 
of new approaches before they can be taken to scale as 
well as the application of innovative models in smaller 
areas.
The likely result of this approach is not a 
vastly different model for each geographic area, but 
rather a set of local variants on a small number of basic 
models that have been shown to work. These variants 
will have different combinations of attributes based on 
what fits the needs of the local population, different 
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configurations of providers and payers, and other local 
characteristics that affect what works best in each 
setting. 
Pilot projects should be continued as long as they 
are found to be effective in meeting their goals, and 
additional participants should be allowed to partici-
pate subject to their ability to establish that they have 
a reasonable likelihood of meeting the goals of the 
program. Systems should be put in place to provide 
evidence on the impact of each initiative in a timely 
manner. Flexibility should be a recurring theme in the 
operation of the center. The appropriate time frame will 
depend on the specifics of each pilot project, such as its 
objectives, the approach proposed for achieving them, 
and the characteristics of the area in which it will be 
conducted.
In any case, provision should be made for 
continuous monitoring of the project’s performance, 
with an eye toward coordination of health care, patient 
satisfaction, and improved effectiveness and efficiency, 
as well as dissemination of information about new 
approaches and shared learning across delivery sites. 
As long as a project appears to be successful along 
those dimensions and is meeting the other objectives 
set out by the agency and the other participants, there is 
a case for continuation. Monitoring and evaluation also 
should focus on aspects of the model that may be most 
useful for application to other pilots in other areas.
One of the most difficult aspects of monitor-
ing these projects will be having data available on a 
timely basis. Sufficient effort and resources should be 
devoted to ensuring that the information necessary for 
implementing, operating, and making adjustments to 
the pilot—as well as information needed for decisions 
on whether and how the project should be continued or 
expanded—is produced and accessible by those who 
need it. Striking an appropriate balance between the 
resources devoted to design and implementation and 
those devoted to information and analysis will require 
careful thought.
Resources should be made available to establish an 
infrastructure to support the success of pilot projects 
in accomplishing the goals of health reform. Delivery 
system reform will likely require more than putting in 
place appropriate incentives. It will also require hav-
ing shared resources available at the community level, 
including health information exchanges to support 
clinical decision-making and facilitate coordinated 
care; 24-hour, seven-day availability of needed after-
hours care, so patients can obtain the care they need 
when they need it; and chronic care nurses to monitor 
patients and help them manage their conditions, so 
they can stay out of the emergency room or the hos-
pital. These resources will enable providers to furnish 
patients with valuable services in a coordinated man-
ner, and will increase the probability of success while 
increasing systemwide efficiency and effectiveness.
The results of the payment innovation pilots should 
be considered in the deliberations of any formal entity 
charged with cost reduction. The new legislation 
calls for establishment of the Independent Payment 
Advisory Board, which will be responsible for achiev-
ing reductions in the growth of Medicare spending 
under certain circumstances.12 The Medicare Payment 
Advisory Commission (MedPAC) will continue to 
analyze access to care, quality of care, and other 
issues affecting Medicare and will continue to advise 
Congress on payments to health plans participating 
in Medicare Advantage and providers participating in 
Medicare fee-for-service. In addition, the Children’s 
Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 
2009 established the Medicaid and CHIP Payment and 
Access Commission (MACPAC) to review Medicaid 
and CHIP access and payment policies and to advise 
Congress on issues affecting the two programs. The 
activities and resources of these various entities should 
be coordinated so that they enhance, rather than inter-
fere with, each other’s functions.
Particular attention should be paid to the coor-
dination of new initiatives intended to improve qual-
ity and efficiency with the policies recommended by 
the Independent Payment Advisory Board, so that the 
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potential impacts of the pilot projects conducted by the 
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation are con-
sidered in the context of developing the board’s recom-
mendations for reducing Medicare spending growth.
Many more questions will need to be addressed 
in establishing the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Innovation; after all, the center itself is a pilot project 
to determine whether the federal government can suc-
cessfully provide the leadership needed to accomplish 
the goals of health reform.13
making Pilots and Demonstrations  
more effective
While the types of pilot projects described above are 
essential for developing rapid, large-scale innovations 
in the payment, organization, and delivery of health 
care, the role of demonstrations will continue. Over 
time, the process of developing and testing more spe-
cific innovations that lend themselves more readily to 
the traditional randomized-trial method of testing will 
continue to be needed—and the Medicare demonstra-
tions program has served that need well. 
Among the innovations that have been devel-
oped as Medicare demonstrations are the hospice ben-
efit, the Program of All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly 
(PACE), Social Health Maintenance Organizations, and 
competitive bidding for durable medical equipment. In 
addition, several important broader policy initiatives 
have been developed as Medicare demonstrations, 
including the inpatient hospital prospective payment 
system based on diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) and 
the risk program (now known as Medicare Advantage). 
Moreover, several initiatives that are viewed as promis-
ing models for health system reform—including the 
Physician Group Practice Demonstration, Hospital 
Quality Incentive Demonstration, and Health Care 
Quality Demonstration—were and are being conducted 
as demonstrations.
Hurdles Facing the Demonstrations 
Program
Several hurdles have kept the demonstrations pro-
cess from being as productive at it might otherwise 
be, and these have the potential to affect the work of 
the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation 
as well. Although there are legitimate reasons why 
some of these hurdles were put in place—and those 
reasons cannot be ignored and must be dealt with—
policymakers need to reexamine them if the center is 
to improve Medicare and Medicaid payment policies 
and strengthen those programs so that they serve as 
examples for the rest of the health care sector.
The health reform legislation addresses some 
of these obstacles—most important, the commitment 
of new resources to develop and implement new pilot 
projects and the authority to extend and expand pilots 
if they are found to be successful—but some others 
still must be addressed. The following discussion, 
which focuses on the current Medicare demonstration 
program but is of some relevance to Medicaid and 
the private sector as well, describes these hurdles and 
offers suggestions for lowering them. We also explore 
how to strike a better balance between protecting the 
integrity of the Medicare program and its trust funds 
and allowing for appropriate and necessary changes in 
program operations.
Transparency. Since the number of potential 
initiatives far exceeds the resources that could reason-
ably be available for development, implementation, 
monitoring, and evaluation, the identification and 
selection of the types of initiatives to pursue is the first 
important set of decisions that must be made.14 (The 
level of resources made available for these functions is 
a separate concern discussed later.)
Making the demonstration process more 
transparent—particularly if it is to be expanded and 
accelerated—would help safeguard its integrity and 
allow for better and more timely decision-making. 
This would involve both establishing an explicit set of 
criteria for identifying and selecting new initiatives for 
development and allowing more open discussion of the 
policy changes of interest and their potential impacts. 
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In addition, publicly reporting information on planned 
and upcoming initiatives, as well as findings from 
ongoing projects, in an electronic newsletter or journal 
distributed by CMS or posted on its Web site would 
provide policymakers and other interested parties 
with a more accessible way to review project and site 
choices and their implications. Alternatively, or per-
haps in addition, such information could be included in 
the annual reports produced by MedPAC.
Multipayer initiatives. The new law calls for 
Medicare to engage in multipayer initiatives, with 
recent actions by the HHS secretary indicating the 
Obama administration’s interest in such initiatives. But 
the federal government’s establishment of such pilots, 
and its participation in them, should be a high priority 
for the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation.
Approval process. One major problem in test-
ing new, potentially productive ideas is the long and 
burdensome process for identifying and selecting the 
models to be tried and getting approval to proceed 
with an approach that may be untested or controver-
sial. Developing and implementing a demonstration or 
pilot involves a lot of technical detail. It also involves 
achieving agreement among various parties both inside 
and outside the government—by nature a painstaking 
process, since the allocation of millions or even bil-
lions of dollars of public resources is at stake. 
Nonetheless, efforts must be made to simplify 
the approval process. Increasing transparency and 
establishing clear lines of accountability would reduce 
the need for a lengthy approval process designed to 
protect against inappropriate proposals that seek only 
to advance the interests of specific institutions or geo-
graphic areas. To the extent that the process is used 
for that purpose, it is neither very productive—in that 
it holds up potentially beneficial projects—nor very 
effective in protecting against undue influence. Another 
improvement would be to vest sufficient authority in 
the HHS secretary or the CMS administrator to make 
the decisions—including negative decisions—but hold 
her or him publicly accountable for those decisions. 
Moreover, those who propose initiatives to be tested 
could be held more accountable for their proposed 
projects to discourage spurious proposals with narrow, 
and sometimes self-serving, objectives—such as by 
posting a listing of each project and its sponsors.15
Evaluation. Another hindrance to improving 
policy is the constraints imposed by the methodol-
ogy currently available for evaluating their impact. 
Demonstrations and pilots generally are carefully 
designed and intended to adhere as much as possible to 
strict methodological criteria in a carefully controlled 
environment. These types of social experiments, how-
ever, are not conducted in laboratories, but in a world 
in which the policy environment is constantly chang-
ing; hence, the ability to maintain strict control over 
all aspects of such trials is limited, and attempts to do 
so can be counterproductive. Consequently, although 
formal evaluations are conducted in most cases, those 
evaluations must deal with imperfect controls and 
incomplete data. 
Further complicating attempts to adhere to 
formal evaluation designs is the fact that, rather than 
being fixed in stone, payment models should continue 
to evolve as experience is gained with them—and that 
evolution may take different forms in each area to 
which a given model is applied. Moreover, in many 
cases, some of the major objectives of the policy 
change being tested are difficult to measure, either 
because they are qualitative in nature or because there 
is an absence of good baseline data with which to 
determine whether the policy in question has had the 
hoped-for effect. New approaches to evaluating the 
results of demonstrations and pilots and identifying 
their implications for developing potential payment 
reforms would be useful in maintaining the appropriate 
balance between scientific rigor and policy usefulness.
The timeliness of evaluations is also a chronic 
issue. Careful evaluation requires accurate and com-
plete data, but the process of collecting, cleaning, 
and analyzing those data is not only inherently time-
consuming but frequently either cannot begin until the 
initiative is over or must start before the full effects of 
the trial have occurred. This can result in failure to act 
on potentially useful policy initiatives at the oppor-
tune moment or premature enactment of incompletely 
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informed policy decisions. Officials should either 
monitor initiatives continuously or develop preliminary 
“bellwether measures” to help indicate directions not 
only for the development of new policies but also for 
changes in the trial itself. In any case, these issues call 
for a reexamination of the methodological tools and 
data systems at our disposal so that we can appropri-
ately use the available information.
Translating pilots into policy. The demon-
stration program would benefit from a more explicit 
process for translating what we learn from these trials 
into new policy. While the health reform law gives the 
HHS secretary the authority to continue or expand a 
trial, making the process more transparent would allow 
for more open discussion of policy changes and their 
potential impacts. The requirement that the secretary 
submit a biannual report to Congress is one way of 
providing a regular vehicle for reporting findings from 
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation initia-
tives. Periodic congressional hearings on potential 
improvements, involving testimony from the HHS or 
CMS and MedPAC, also would help make the endpoint 
of the process more visible.
Resource availability. The preceding discus-
sion emphasizes the importance of maintaining the 
integrity of the process of identifying, developing, 
testing, evaluating, and implementing promising inno-
vations in Medicare—and potentially throughout the 
health care system. Equally important, however, is hav-
ing the resources necessary to carry out such a process 
and make needed investments in the program and in 
the health system. Unfortunately, it is increasingly dif-
ficult to find those resources in the budget environment 
in which Medicare operates. As Medicare provides 
access to care for the rapidly growing number of older 
Americans, and as Medicare benefits make up an ever-
increasing share of both national health expenditures 
and the federal budget, the resources available for 
administration consistently shrink as a proportion of 
the program’s size. 
There is bipartisan agreement that CMS is 
underfunded to carry out its day-to-day functions prop-
erly, and that, given the record federal budget deficit, 
it is difficult to find the resources to remedy that situ-
ation.16 Even within that context, the research budget 
out of which CMS funds demonstration activities is 
deteriorating, falling from 6.2 percent of the agency’s 
program management budget in 2001 to 1.4 percent 
in 2008.17 Both the level of funding and its decline are 
alarming, particularly in light of the likely increase in 
the program’s role in implementing systemwide health 
reform. If more new initiatives are to be developed 
and implemented—and if these are to be both larger in 
scope and more timely—sufficient resources should be 
provided to carry them out. Failure to do so puts at risk 
the ability to identify and successfully implement new 
initiatives.
Among the functions that would require suf-
ficient resources are: supplying timely data to support 
pilot sites and to support CMS in implementing and 
monitoring the pilots, and developing any rewards and 
bonuses involved; devoting sufficient staff to develop, 
implement, monitor, and oversee the pilots; and provid-
ing adequate contracting funds to carry out the evalu-
ations that will determine whether the pilots are to be 
continued or expanded and how they can be used as 
examples for other approaches in other areas.
The new law earmarks funds for the operation 
of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation 
and for the administration, design, and implementation 
of the pilots, but lawmakers should give consideration 
to both the appropriate amount and the appropriate 
allocation of funds for all the center’s activities. 
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cONclusIONs
In a recent piece for the New Yorker, the physician and 
journalist Atul Gawande wrote:
At this point, we can’t afford any illusions: 
the system won’t fix itself, and there’s no piece 
of legislation that will have all the answers, 
either. The task will require dedicated and 
talented people in government agencies and in 
communities who recognize that the country’s 
future depends on their sidestepping the 
ideological battles, encouraging local change, 
and following the results. But if we’re willing 
to accept an arduous, messy, and continuous 
process we can come to grips with a problem 
even of this immensity. We’ve done it before.18
The new health reform law provides a platform 
on which to build the kinds of innovations that have 
the potential to bend the health care cost curve. In the 
end, however, the success or failure of health reform 
will be determined by whether the innovations that 
are developed succeed in controlling costs and mak-
ing health reform sustainable. That success, in turn, will 
depend to a great extent on how the Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid Innovation is operated and managed, and 
how the issues described here are addressed.
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